20th Century – Page 355 – Deadliest American Disasters and Large-Loss-of-Life Events (2024)

Compiled by B. Wayne Blanchard, Dec 2008; modified Jan 2020, for website: Deadliest American Disasters and Large-Loss-Of-Life Events. https://www.usdeadlyevents.com/

–957-1,031 Blanchard range.

— <1,200 Cussler. General Slocum. National Underwater and Marine Agency (non-profit), 1994.[1]

— 1,031 History.com. This Day in History, Disaster, June 15, 1904. River Excursion Ends…

— 1,030 NFPA. Key Dates in Fire History. 1996

— 1,030 NFPA. The 1984 Fire Almanac. 1983, 140.

— 1,025 Cudahy. Around Manhattan Island and Other Maritime Tales of NY. 1997, p. x.

— 1,021 Berman 1972, 36.

— 1,021 Haberman 2002

— 1,021 Kirschman and Samuels 2002.

— 1,021 Smith, Roger. Catastrophes and Disasters. Edinburgh & NY: Chambers, 1992, p. 158.

— 1,021 Smithsonian. “A Spectacle of Horror: The Burning of the General Slocum.” 2-21-2012

— 1,021 Syracuse Herald, NY. “Captain Held in Boat Blast Fatal to 39,” 9-10-1932, p.2, c.7.

— 1,021 Wingfield (NY Public Library). “The General Slocum Disaster of June 15, 1904.” 6-13-2011.

— >1,000 NYC Parks, NYC Dept. of Parks & Recreation. “Tompkins Square Park. Slocum…”

— >1,000 Smith. Dennis Smith’s History of Firefighting in America... 1978, p. 114.

— 1,000 Country Beautiful. Great Fires of America. 1973, 101; CRED, EM DAT Database.

— ~1,000 Insurance Engineering (Vol. 8, No. 1, July, 1904). “Disasters on the Water,” p. 49.

— 1,000 Public Opinion. “News of the World,” Vol. XXXVI, no. 26, 822.

— 958 Brooklyn Daily Eagle Almanac 1905. “The Slocum Disaster,” Vol. XX, 1905, 614.

— 958 U.S. Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report 1905, p. 43.

— 957 U.S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor. Annual Report 1904, p. 31; US SIS. 1904, 6.

— 957 US Commission of Investigation. Report of…upon the General Slocum Disaster. P.23.

–893 Identified passengers (out of 1,358 on board)

— 62 Missing, including unidentified dead passengers

–955 Passengers

–2 Crew (out of 30)

–957 Passengers and Crew

Narrative Information (alphabetical order by source)

Brooklyn Daily Eagle Almanac 1905: “The excursion boat, General Slocum, Captain W. H. Van Schaick, leaving foot of 23d st., Mhtn. N. Y. City, at 9:30 A. M., June 15, 1904 carrying a Sunday School excursion party of St. Mark’s Lutheran Church, of Sixth st., Mhtn., numbering 1,348, mostly women and children, to Locust Grove. L I, caught fire in a barrel of packing hay in the forward part of the hold about 10 A. M. while passing Ward’s Island. The blaze spread rapidly to the main and hurricane decks. Wild panic followed, with hundreds either crowded or leaping before the flames, over the rails. While the vessel was reaching the shore of North Brothers Island, a run of 2 miles, the horror of burning and drowning continued. Inability to use the life boats or even the life preservers intensified the disaster. The vessel, beached at North Brothers Island, burned to the water’s edge with many victims charred in the hold.

“Details make a story of unutterable hor­rors. All rescue possible by individuals, tugs and boats immediately at hand. and later relief by the city departments was given. The morgue at Bellevue Hospital and temporary morgues were filled to overflowing. The total loss of life was 958, and of injured 175. On June 16 (Thursday), the flags at the Borough Halls and on Public School buildings were at half mast. Mayor Mc­Clellan appointed a committee of 12 prominent citizens to take charge of the moneys for relief of the destitute and burial of the dead, and President Roosevelt issued orders to Secretary Cortelyou to investigate and fix the blame.

“On June 28, at the Coroner’s inquest, held be­fore Coroner Joseph S. Berry, at 2d Battery Armory, Bathgate av. and 177th st, Bronx, the ver­dict of the jury was that Frank A. Barnaby, Pres. of the Knickerbocker Steamboat Co.; J. K. Atkinson, Sec.; all of the directors, Capt. Wm. H. Van Schaick, Mate Edward Flanagan and Henry Lundberg, Assistant U. S. Steamboat In­spector, were guilty of criminal negligence and were criminally responsible. On the same date $50,000 was appropriated by Board of Aldermen for burial of unidentified dead. June 29 the relief fund had reached $110,000. July 23 the relief com­mittee reported $64,000 expended and $60,000 held as a reserve fund for orphans and other expenses. July 29 the Federal Grand Jury found indictments against Capt. Wm. H, Van Schaick, Henry Lund­berg. John J. Fleming, Assistant United States In­spectors; Frank A. Barnaby. President of the Knickerbocker Steamboat Co.; Jas. K. Atkinson, Sec.; F. B. Dexter. Treas., and Capt. John A. Pease, Commodore of the Knickerbocker Steam­boat Co. In October the report of the Federal Commission was published, censuring both the in­spection service and Slocum owners and officials.” (Brooklyn Daily Eagle Almanac 1905. “The Slocum Disaster,” Vol. XX, 1905, p. 614.)

Country Beautiful: “…on June 15, 1904, over a thousand lives, more than half of them children, were lost by fire on the New York excursion boat, the General Slocum. Since it was a work day, most of the passengers were women and children. The trip was an annual Sunday school outing and all had been looking forward to the ride on the large, wooden paddle steamer. A band even played as the ship set out down the river. As the boat traveled, people on the shore noticed that the ship was on fire. The passengers, however, did not detect it for some time.

“The large loss of life was partly due to the complete lack of good judgment on the part of the captain. He headed the boat straight into the wind, fanning the fire. There was apparatus waiting on the shore to help fight the fire, yet the General Slocum continued to steam away. Many of the women and children who previously had been having a good time, listening to the music and catching the summer breeze, now were jumping overboard or being burned by the fire. Many were later found caught in the great paddle-wheel.

Attempts had been made to put out the fire. The crew members worked hard to extinguish it, but the equipment on board was useless. Poor leadership, rotten fire hose and lack of proper life preservers took its terrible toll.” (Country Beautiful. Great Fires of America. 1973, p. 101.)

Fireproof Magazine: “While the Iroquois lesson has been…disregarded on shore, the equally appalling Slocum lesson has been disregarded afloat. Not one step has been taken toward remedying the frightful conditions revealed by the destruction of the General Slocum, and later by that of the Glen Island.[2] The House passed five bills in one day to improve inspection servicer and insure the presence of superficial fittings of good quality on excursion boats, but not one of them touched the fundamental question of the safety of the boat itself. It remains as it always has been, perfectly lawful to build and pack with human beings a boat that will flash into flame at the touch of a match.” (Fireproof Magazine. “Two Frightful Lessons in Vain,” Vol. 6, No. 4, April, 1905, p. 211.)

History.com: “More than 1,000 people taking a pleasure trip on New York City’s East River are drowned or burned to death when a fire sweeps through the boat. This was one of the United States’ worst maritime disasters.

“The riverboat-style steamer General Slocum was built in 1890 and used mostly as a vehicle for taking large groups on day outings. On June 15, the St. Mark’s German Lutheran Church assembled a group of 1,360 people, mostly children and teachers, for their annual Sunday School picnic. The picnic was to take place at Locust Point in the Bronx after a cruise up the East River on the General Slocum.

“At about 9 a.m., the dangerously overcrowded boat left its dock in Manhattan with Captain William Van Schaik in charge. As the boat passed 83rd Street, accounts indicate that a child spotted a fire in a storeroom and reported it to Captain Van Schaik. Reportedly the captain responded, “Shut up and mind your own business.” But as the smoke became more obvious, crew members were sent to investigate. By this time, the storeroom, filled with a combination of oil and excelsior (wood shavings used for packing), was blazing out of control. The onboard fire hose, which had never been used, tested or inspected, did not work.

“Captain Van Schaik made a fateful decision at this time. Instead of directing the boat to the nearest dock where firefighters could engage the fire, he pointed the boat toward a small island in the East River. He later told investigators that he did not want to risk spreading the fire to the dock and the rest of the city, but the strategy proved deadly for the passengers. Instead of grounding the boat on the sand, the boat crashed onto the rocks of the island’s shore.

“At this point, other factors also combined to exacerbate the situation. The lifeboats were so firmly tied to the steamer that they could not be released. The life preservers had not been filled with cork, but a non-buoyant material that made them weighty. The children who used them sank to the bottom of the river. Other children were trampled to death in the panic. More people were killed when the raging fire collapsed some of the decks, plunging them into the fire.

“In all, 630 bodies were recovered and another 401 were missing and presumed dead. A cannon was brought to the scene and fired over the river the next day to loosen bodies from the river mud. The boat’s crew, and officers in the Knickerbocker Company, owner and operator of the General Slocum, were charged with criminal negligence. However, only Captain Van Schaik received a prison sentence. He was supposed to serve 10 years, but was pardoned due to old age in 1908. President Theodore Roosevelt fired the chief inspector of the U. S. Steamboat Inspection Service in the aftermath of the accident; wholesale changes in the industry followed. A mass grave was set up in Queens for the victims and a yearly memorial was held to honor their memory.” (History.com. This Day in History, 15 June 1904. “River Excursion Ends in Tragedy”)

Insurance Engineering, 1904: “By the burning of the wooden steamboat General Slocum on June I5, on the East River, New York, about I,000 persons, mostly women and children, lost their lives. A majority of the unfortunates perished by drowning; others were either burned to death or crushed to death by falling parts of the boat that had burned away from their supports. The immediate cause of this great loss of life may be said to be the negligence of Government inspectors who, only a few days prior to the disaster, pronounced the General Slocum safe. When the test came, the life preservers were found to be worthless. The boat was inadequately equipped for fighting fire. Mismanagement is also alleged. Furthermore, the boat was of a very combustible type.

“From the testimony of several witnesses the fire is believed to have started in a general storeroom containing oils, awnings, rope, etc., on the lower deck forward. On the morning of the disaster, glasses packed in hay were received on board, and the hay, after the glasses were unpacked, was thrown into this storeroom. It is probable that a burning match, a cigar stub, or something else was carelessly thrown into the room. The fire must have broken out soon after the boat left the dock, for it was discovered while the General Slocum was in plain view of New York City. An attempt to smother the flames was futile. A hose stream, such as the boat afforded, was ineffective. In the meantime, the craft proceeded up the river, and in a short time the entire boat was afire. It is probable that the pilots were not aware of the fire until it was well underway, but it is not plain why the boat was taken two miles or more before it was beached. Starting in the forward part of the boat, the flames had every opportunity to sweep from one end to the other. Their spread was very rapid.

“Commenting on this disaster, Engineering News says with truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth:

The typical American passenger steamboat in use on inland waters consists of a wooden or steel hull of light draft, upon which is built a light wooden superstructure extending far out over the hull on each side, and rising upward for two or three to half a dozen or more decks or stories. These stories are supported on light wooden columns, and floors, sheathing and partitions are made, as a rule, of pine or other light lumber. The whole is covered so liberally with paint that fire will run over it almost as readily as over a powder train.

Take the upper works of the General Slocum, or of any of the finest Sound or river steamers, off the hull and place them on a building lot, in any part of New York City. Fill the decks with such a crowd as is to be seen on excursion boats on any summer’s day; or instead, if it be a night boat, fill the staterooms and berths with sleeping passengers as they are filled daily during the season. Then start a fire in or underneath this vast tinder box, let it reach good headway, and then set the New York fire department to extinguish it and save the lives of those in peril. We risk nothing in saying that the structure will be reduced to ruins before the finest fire department in the world can extinguish the flames and that the list of lives lost in the conflagration before rescue can come will fill columns in the newspapers.

No one familiar with the inflammable[3] construction of American passenger steamers will deny that this is true; yet we place a three or four-story tinder box on the hull of a vessel, send it out on the water far from the help of any fire department, and when disaster occurs try to find a scapegoat in those who owned or managed the boat or those whom the Government pays to inspect such vessels.

If this were the only possible way to build a steamboat, we should have to make the best of it. It would be necessary th«n to fix our attention on such makeshifts to mitigate danger as automatic sprinklers and other contrivances for checking fire at its start. We should have to console ourselves with the reflection that such great disasters as that of the General Slocum come very seldom, and put up with the danger as a part of the necessary risk of life under modern conditions.

But because for two or three generations since the art of steamboat construction began everybody has built steamboats in a certain way, it does not follow that that is the only possible way. Indeed, with the increasing scarcity and cost of this inflammable pine lumber, (which American builders have used so long that they have come to consider it impossible to use anything else) we shall be compelled to find substitutes. We cannot, indeed, copy directly the present practice in fireproof construction in erecting the superstructure of a steamboat; but we can use incombustible materials in constructing it. and where we are compelled to use wood we can impregnate it with fire-retarding chemicals and cover it with fire-retardant paints.

A SAFETY EQUIPMENT FOE STEAMBOATS.

“Inspector A. A. Morse of the Home Insurance Company of New York, whose headquarters are in Chicago, sends the following communication to Insurance Engineering on the fire protection of steamboats, etc.:

“In contemplating the recent fearful catastrophe on the East River, New York, the burning of the General Slocum, and the comments made relative to the fire protection of the same, I am reminded of an inspection made by the writer a few years ago of one of our late steamers engaged in the passenger and freight traffic, the motive being to ascertain the efficiency of the fire protection, claimed by the owners to be of great importance and consisting of a few perforated pipes extending through various parts of the boat and supplied with water from a very small pump of much less than I00-gallons capacity per minute, and altogether, to my mind, of no use whatever.

“I was, however, impressed with the importance and practicability of equipping all such boats with a complete system of automatic sprinklers, installing one wet-pipe system with one main riser of proper size to supply the entire system if necessary, this riser to be located in the center of the boat and extending from the hold of the ship to the upper deck, with cross main on each deck and laterals extending from this cross main on either side to extreme end of decks, with piping and head areas to conform to present standards, and with sprinkler heads placed in every room, closet or concealed space, insuring complete and positive protection to every portion of the boat, the piping to be placed close against under side of decks with heads pendant and protected by metal hoods, thus placing the system as much out of the way as possible.

“One source of water supply would be sufficient and should consist of an underwriters’ fire pump of not less than 500 gallons per minute capacity, pump to be placed in hold of ship and below water line, taking water direct from outside under gravity pressure and discharging into said main riser. This pump should be fitted with steam regulator and a pressure of not less than 75 to 80 pounds maintained in sprinkler pipes at all times when boat is in service. Electric alarm and annunciator should be attached. Such an equipment would be an absolute preventive against loss by fires under any and all circ*mstances and afford absolute safety to passengers and freight.

“The cost of such equipment would be trifling compared to the benefits secured, even from an insurance standpoint. As there is not a single point on which to base an intelligible objection against such protection, in justice to the safety of the lives of the vast numbers traveling on the water it should be made obligatory.”

FIRE PROTECTION NOT A DIFFICULT PROBLEM.

“F. E. MacKnight, an inspector for the Southeastern Tariff Association, Atlanta, Ga., also advocates automatic sprinkler protection for steamboats and favors equipping them with an automatic thermostatic fire-alarm system. He writes to Insurance Engineering:

“Once more the attention of the public is called to a frightful calamity which, from all accounts, bids fair to compare with, if not exceed in loss of life and horrible details, the recent Iroquois Theater fire. I refer to the destruction of the General Slocum. For the past few years these events have happened with frequency, and the reading public is in a measure becoming accustomed to seeing scare headlines in the daily newspapers. Not until such things have occurred, and the damage is done, do the authorities take measures that will help to correct the evil, and sometimes not even then. Agitation by the press is usually required to produce results. In the case of the burning of the General Slocum, I wish to call attention to a few facts. There is no reason why the pleasure seeking public, also those forced to travel by reason of profession, cannot and should not be just as fully protected against fire when afloat as when on shore.

“With such modern appliances at hand as automatic sprinklers and thermostats, there are no more engineering difficulties or problems involved to properly protect a vessel against fire than are to be found in equipping a modern building. With a system of extinguishing and signaling devices, properly installed in any river, harbor, or sea-going craft, loss by fire would be reduced to the minimum, with a resultant lessening of loss of life. I am fully convinced that had such protection been installed in the General Slocum, she would not have been destroyed.

“The writer, during 20 years’ experience, has not heard of a single instance where automatic sprinklers have been introduced in any floating vessel, and only one instance where even an estimate was made. Plans and specifications were made and bids submitted for installing Gray sprinklers in one of the coastwise steamships (Morgan line I think), in 1885, but nothing ever came of it. That was long before the use of the pressure tank as a sprinkler supply became so general. Only a connection to the ship’s pumps was considered in this particular case, but even such service would have been effective in case of fire.

“Large vessels of all descriptions, especially passenger steamships and excursion steamers, could and should have their holds, furnace rooms, coal bunkers, engine rooms, galleys (in fact all portions below water line and not readily accessible) protected with automatic sprinklers, supplied by a large pressure tank with an auxiliary connection to the ship’s pumps. A pressure tank could be located in the coal bunkers or other suitable place, with the end containing gauge glass, controlling valves, etc., protruding into the fire room, or engine room, whichever is most convenient. The pressure gauge should be in the engine room, on a board with other gauges, and a daily record of water level and air pressure made and filed by engineer.

“In nearly all cases wet-pipe systems could be employed as, during cold weather, excursion steamers are generally out of commission. For vessels in commission during inclement weather, either a dry-pipe system with compressed air in the pipes, or a system similar to that required by the Building Code of New York City for cellars and basem*nts of mercantile risks, would be acceptable. By this, I do not refer to ‘perforated pipe systems.’ In addition to such sprinkler protection there should be an approved thermostat automatic fire alarm system, with annunciators in engine room and pilot house.

“Possibly one of the most dangerous practices and prolific sources of danger on board excursion, and even regular river and harbor passenger vessels, is the caterer’s lunch counter. Usually an oil or gasoline stove for cooking and warming food is employed, and in a manner that will bear investigation.”

“Mr. MacKnight rightly concludes that it would seem that action by the proper authorities should be taken at once, and ordinances framed requiring proper protective appliances for all passenger craft, just as the municipal authorities now require all possible protection in theaters and other public places.” (Insurance Engineering, “Disasters on the Water,” 8/1, July, 1904, pp. 49-53.)

NYC Parks: “Slocum Memorial Fountain. Dedicated in 1906, this fountain serves as a reminder of those who died aboard the excursion steamer General Slocum on June 15, 1904. Prior to September 11, 2001, the burning of the General Slocum had the highest death toll of any disaster in New York City history. The incident claimed an irreplaceable part of the Lower East Side community once known as Little Germany and remains the worst inland-waters, peacetime tragedy in the nation’s history.

“The Slocum was a triple-decker wooden ship built in 1891, named after General Henry Warner Slocum (1827-1894) who commanded the extreme right line of the Union Army at Gettysburg and represented the City of Brooklyn in Congress for three terms. It was one of nearly a dozen excursion steamers that traveled around New York waterways, enabling working class people to escape the city even if just for a few hours. On its final voyage, the Slocum was to vary its normal two trips to the Rockaways in order to bring a large party to Locust Grove on Long Island.

“The approximately 1,300 passengers and 35 member crew included the congregation of St. Mark’s Evangelical Lutheran Church, located on 6th Street near 2nd Avenue, who were en route to their seventeenth annual picnic. As it was a weekday, the majority of the German immigrants and people of German descent who comprised the group were women and children. This was also true for the other passengers who hailed from all over the New York area.

“Twenty minutes after the ship departed the Third Street pier on the East River, it entered the ever treacherous junction of the East River, New York Harbor and Long Island Sound. There it was overtaken not by the current but by flames and Captain William Van Schaik docked, shortly after 10AM, at North Brother Island, near Riker’s Island. Of the more than 1,000 people who died, many were buried in the Lutheran cemetery in Middle Village, Queens, where a monument was erected in 1905 to honor the unidentified dead. The disaster was the fatal end of a ship with a history of accidents and was attributed to inadequate safety precautions and the negligence of the Captain.

“The Slocum Memorial Fountain by sculptor Bruno Louis Zimm was donated by the Sympathy Society of German Ladies and installed in Tompkins Square Park, a central feature of the neighborhood. The nine foot upright stele is made of pink Tennessee marble with a low relief of two children looking seaward as well as a lionhead spout. Zimm, who was a member of the Woodstock Artists Colony, also designed a similar fountain, the Women’s Health Protective Monument, located at 116th Street and Riverside Drive, and the frieze on the pediment of the Fine Arts building in San Francisco.” (NYC Parks, New York City Department of Parks & Recreation. “Tompkins Square Park. Slocum Memorial Fountain.”

NYT: “The report [Slocum Report] is exhaustive and covers 62 printed pages….It begins with a description of the vessel, in the course of which it is stated that:

All the upper works of this vessel were constructed of light wood, and had been painted and varnished many times, and were, therefore, in a highly inflammable condition. In the construction of the vessel there were no safeguards against fire other than compliance with the regulations as regards the proximity of woodwork to boilers. The vessel had no fireproof hatches or bulkheads, and was built entirely of wood.

“After stating that when a fire once got headway on such a vessel it could not possibly be checked, the report says:

There are many similar vessels doing service in the waters of the United States, the construction of which is quite as dangerous as that of the Slocum, and unless this kind of construction shall be prohibited or modified by law the safety of a large number of passengers carried by excursion steamers and steamers plying on the inland waters of the United States can not be assured.

“The report adds points in connection with the fire on the steamboat now generally known throughout the exhaustive Coroner’s inquest, but the new fact was brought out at the Commission’s hearings that the…porter of the boat, William Payne, went into the forward cabin, where the fire started, on the day of the disaster, and having lighted one of the lamps stored there with a match ‘threw the match on a bench.’ He also found when he entered the cabin, filled as it was with highly inflammable material, that an oiler was working there using an open torch as a light….

“The report then exhaustively reviews the fire-fighting appliances on the Slocum; how the hose burst and the crew attempted to couple on another hose without removing the coupling still remaining on the standpipe, how the crew pulled down a few life preservers, and how the master of the vessel gave the order to run full speed to North Brother Island without going to the scene of the fire or getting the opinions of his assistants as to where to beach the vessel.

“Capt. Van Schaick is blamed in these words:

The evidence before the commission establishes the fact that the master made no attempt whatsoever to fight the fire, to examine its condition, or to control, assure, direct, or aid the passengers in any way whatever. It is alleged that he was unable to reach the place where the passengers were by reason of the fire, but this is contradicted by the evidence of many witnesses, and is obviously not true.

“From a review of the whole testimony as to the time of the discovery of the fire the commission comes to the conclusion that it was first discovered before reaching Ward’s Island; that the mate, Edward Flanagan, knew of it at that time and informed the pilothouse. The statements of the Captain and pilots radically disagree with statements by other witnesses, but the commission states that it is forced by the weight of the entire evidence to the belief that ‘the statements of the men in the pilothouse must be disregarded, and that they are incorrect in so far as they refer to the time the fire was first discovered.’ The report also says:

After careful consideration of the entire testimony as to the time of the discovery of the fire, the commission is of the opinion that the men in the pilot house had knowledge of the fire before the steamer passed the eastern end of Ward’s Island. The commission therefore believes that the master knew of the fire in time to have beached the vessel either in Little Hell Gate to the westward of the Sunken Meadows or in the Bronx Kills to the eastward of the Sunken Meadows, and to have thereby gained the great and essential advantage of placing the vessel with her stern to the wind so that the flames would be driven forward and away from the passengers, and delayed the beaching of the vessel for several minutes longer than was necessary.

“The commission finds that the vessel was beached with her bow in seven feet of water, so that the few persons there jumped into the water not much over their heads, but the stern of the boat, where all the passengers were congregated, was in from ten to thirty feet of water, so that from 400 to 600 persons were drowned at that point after the vessel had been beached. The report then says:

The commission is therefore of the opinion that Pilot Van Wart showed bad judgment or lack of skill in beaching the vessel at a considerable angle with the shore line of North Brother Island, thus leaving in deep water all but the bow of the boat, which was in flames, and affording the passengers who could not swim little opportunity to save their lives. Even had it been necessary to beach on North Brother Island, the vessel should have been laid on the shoal to the northward and eastward of the island, approximately tangent and parallel to the shore line, with her keel hard on the bottom, the burning side of the vessel to leeward and her guard on the starboard side overhanging shoal water, so that the passengers could have dropped overboard on that side and waded ashore.

“The commission finds ‘that most if not all the life preservers were of granulated cork, and at least a large percentage of them were bad, due mainly to rotten covers, which tore under the handling to which they were subjected.’ It finds that the mate, ‘in distinct violation of the law and contrary to the requirements of the vessel’s certificate, was not a licensed officer’; that there were no fire drills, and adds:

The inefficiency and poor quality of the deck crew of this vessel, doubtless typical of the majority of the crews of excursion steamers, is one of the essential facts that caused the loss of so many lives.

“The Commission pays tribute to the masters of the tugs John L. Wade and Walter Tracy, without the assistance of whom, it says, the loss of life would have been from 200 to 350 greater.

“All of the passengers who were saved, with but few exceptions, the report states, were saved by outside assistance. ‘This indicates’ the commission says, ‘the almost complete helplessness of an excursion party of this particular composition, even when most of the passengers were brought to a place within at least 200 feet of the shore. A very important conclusion from this set of facts is that the law and regulations must recognize the fact that an excursion party must be taken care of, and cannot take care of itself’.”

“Summing up the situation, the commission says:

The salient points of this disaster to be noted for future use are as follows:

• The Slocum was probably typical in almost all her conditions of many of the excursion boats in New York Harbor and, doubtless, elsewhere.
• The peculiar helplessness characteristic of an excursion crowd in case of disaster.
• Peculiar inflammability of vessel and extraordinarily swift progress of fire.
• Marked inefficiency of crew, both in this case and probably in most other excursion vessels, principally due to lack of organization and drill.
• Total lack of fire drills, boat drills, and established discipline.
• Unlicensed mate.
• Extremely dangerous condition of the forward cabin.
• Total failure of fire hose.
• Badly defective condition of life-preservers.
• Inefficient inspection of this vessel.
• Neglect of master to fight fire or aid passengers, or to give any orders to such end.
• Neglect of master to beach the vessel or to put her alongside of a wharf immediately after receiving a report of the existence of the fire, and his action in maintaining a high speed and creating thereby a strong draught of air from forward sweeping the flames aft.

“The commission gives its opinions as to the responsibilities of owners, masters, and employees of excursion vessels, and adds this conclusion:

While it is true that it is the business of the Steamboat Inspection Service to see that proper safety appliances as required by law are provided, this by no means relieves the owner from a similar legal and moral obligation, nor from the liability for the maintenance of proper crew discipline. The commission is of the opinion that the owners of the General Slocum are censurable in a high degree for the inadequate and improper conditions prevailing on board this vessel, and than, whatever may be their technical legal liability, they and their executive agents share largely in the moral responsibility for the awful results of this disaster.

“In connection with its inquiry, the commission made a thorough investigation of the conditions and actual workings of the Steamboat Inspection Service of the Port of New York, both for the explanation of certain features of the disaster and for the prevention of similar disasters. It did not extend its inquiry beyond the Port of new York, as it says that a general investigation would have been impracticable at present and would have delayed the report until its usefulness would have been greatly diminished. The commission believes that, as New York is the most important port in the country, a careful inquiry into the workings of the service there would serve as a sufficient basis for general remedial recommendations.

“The commission finds that the work of the local Inspectors was ‘inefficient and unsatisfactory’ and that they were interpreting their duties in a manner not warranted by the statures. For instance, it was their uniform habit to say that fire hose was ‘in good condition.’ According to the testimony of the Inspectors themselves, the hose was subjected to a visual inspection.

The absurd and inadequate nature of such mere visual inspection of fire hose…is apparent from the innumerable cases in which hose equipment , passed at the regular inspection, burst on the reinspection under pressures all below the statutory requirement, and varying from 5 to 95 pounds. In some vessels 60 per cent of the hose equipment was condemned.

“The inspection of life preservers on all vessels was confined to looking them over and taking down those which ‘looked bad’. The Inspectors never lowered the boats or examined the tackle. Assistant Inspectors were not drilled as to their duties, but were turned loose to do the best they could. The report recommends that there be a complete reorganization of the force of Assistant Inspectors with a view of eliminating those who have shown their incompetency.

“’The Supervising Inspector,’ the commission says, ‘knew of the existence of the faulty and inefficient system and of the negligence of the local Inspectors to enforce and the actual failure of the assistants to make proper inspection. If he did not know of these, or, knowing the, did not take steps to remedy them, he is equally chargeable with neglect of duty’.

“The commission goes at great length into the deficiencies found on vessels reinspected. Boilers and hulls were found to be substantially good, but fire pumps, hose, and life preservers were universally in bad condition, in spite of the fact that all had been previously passed upon as good. The gross inefficiency of the system was shown when on reinspection the percentage of deficiency in life-saving apparatus was found to be 33 per cent on excursion and 14.33 per cent on ferryboats, while in fire hose the deficiency was 15.57 on ocean, 18.78 on inland, 26.35 on excursion, 15.53 on ferry, and 17.80 on tow boats….

“Authority is asked to give the Department of Commerce and Labor absolute authority to enforce upon owners of vessels provisions as to safety appliances and construction, and to say just what appliances vessels must carry, the present laws being regarded as inadequate in this regard. It recommends that the law be so amended as to make it possible readily to bring home a criminal liability upon individual owners where their vessels have been navigated without proper equipment. Inspectors should also have power to see that defective equipment is destroyed as well as condemned, and to see that fire drills and boat drills are regularly held. The Government should also have the power to seize a vessel which does not comply with the provisions of the law….” (New York Times. “Slocum Report In: Inspectors Removed,” October 17, 1904.)

Public Opinion, June 23, 1904: “Monday, June 20…The inquest into the cause of the General Slocum disaster began in New York…

“Tuesday, June 21…The president named a commission to inquire into the Slocum disaster…

“Thursday, June 23…The wreck of the General Slocum was raised; the revised police list of the lost was over 1,000.” (Public Opinion. “News of the World,” Vol. XXXVI, No. 24, June 1904.)

“A great Calamity like the burning of the excursion steamer General Slocum last week usually has the effect of making similar catastrophes less likely to occur again. The Iroquois fire in Chicago resulted in the overhauling of theaters throughout the country and abroad. The destruction of the Slocum will make pleasure-seekers on the water un­willing to entrust their lives aboard unsafe and highly in­flammable boats, and in this way the owners of excursion vessels will be compelled to make their craft reasonably safe even in case of a fire breaking out when the decks are packed with an uncontrollable crowd. The facts most strongly brought out in the comment on the disaster are that the Slocum in common with all similar vessels was of flimsy construction and that steamboat inspection as now carried out is a useless farce—two faults which it should not be difficult to remedy.” (Public Opinion. “The Week,” Vol. XXXVI, No. 25, June 23, 1904, p. 771.)

“One of the worst marine disasters on record occurred last week in New York waters. The appalling loss of life and the fact that thousands of people at this season are every day exposed to peril on the water, makes the catastrophe an event of national importance.

“The excursion steamer General Slocum had been char­tered to carry a Sunday-school party up the sound. Leav­ing her dock at about 9 o’clock on the morning of the 15th, the steamer proceeded up East river; but she had not passed the city limits when fire was discovered in the for­ward part of the vessel. Her captain then headed the steamer for North Brother island at the entrance of the sound, where she was run ashore. Slipping away from the island, the General Slocum drifted a short distance and then sank—a total wreck. As the flames raged, hun­dreds of children, with their mothers, friends, and teach­ers, jumped overboard and were drowned; many more, fearing to leap, were consumed in the fire; others in the huddled multitude on the lower decks were crushed by the collapse of the hurricane deck after the flames had eaten away the supports. It may never be known how many re­mained in the seething hulk carried away by the tide and left to settle in the river-bed half a mile above. Esti­mates of the number lost vary, but none are less than 800. Many were rescued in the water by volunteer life-savers, but their work was impeded by the fact that the life-preservers, when they were used at all, proved to be rot­ten and worse than useless. The steamer had passed an inspection within six weeks of the disaster.

“Press Comment

“The comment on the burning of the General Slocum is valuable because it points out the ways in which similar catastrophes may be avoided in the future. Of this de­scription is the editorial in the New York Herald:

The chief blame seems to be not with individuals, but with the system under which such a catastrophe is pos­sible. As is well known, the federal government has charge of all steam vessels plying our navigable waters. Inspection of the hull, machinery, life-saving appliances and other devices are made at least once a year by gov­ernment officials and licenses are granted. Knowledge that there is such official supervision inspires the pub­lic with confidence. But it is mournfully evident that this system looks only to the soundness of the vessel and her appliances, whatever these may be, and does not make such radical requirements touching the material of the hull or superstructure as would guard against such a ca­lamity. Craft with frail and highly inflammable super­structures should not be licensed to carry thousands of helpless women and children. When the slight wooden stanchions—presumably covered with oil paint—that sup­ported the upper deck of the General Slocum burned the deck collapsed. Iron stanchions and iron deck beams and generally non-combustible upper works should be demand­ed in every excursion craft. The federal authorities should either abandon their system of supervision of such vessels or make it effectual.

“A Strong Indictment

The Evening Post’s indictment of those responsible, at least in a measure, for the catastrophe is no less severe:

Words are too feeble to express the pity and the hor­ror of this disaster. The character of the victims—women, mostly, and children of tender years—the swift­ness of the destruction that has overtaken half a modest parish, the terror of sweeping flames, and of loaded decks collapsing into the furnace below—all these heart-rending features of Wednesday’s tragedy strain the compassion of the mere reader to the point of numbness. But out of the great pity of it an indignant voice must find strength to cry: Was this sickening calamity preventable, or must we expect to see it repeated from time to time? Pre­ventable, in the fullest sense, it probably was not. In a large degree, however, Wednesday’s accident was prevent­able. The death list should not have run beyond those crushed or pushed overboard in the first panic. The re­sponsibility for hundreds of the lives sacrificed lies at the door of the government steamboat inspectors, who declared that the General Slocum was properly provided with fire-and life-saving apparatus. In the face of this false dec­laration, look at the facts: Pumps and fire hose failed to work, not a boat was lowered, not a life-raft floated, the life-preservers dragged down those who wore them. What help came to the fated vessel was from outside, and acci­dental. The General Slocum, bearing the inspectors’ cer­tificate of full equipment, had no effective means of sav­ing her own hull from fire or the life of a single passenger from drowning.

“What are we to say,” the Press asks, “of those who lure the public into floating pyres of tinder that may blot out the lives of the human cargo in a flash?”

“What are we to say of the official authority which en­courages or permits such invention and practice of slaugh­ter? As Chicago officials were indicted for their partici­pation in the hideous crime of the Iroquois theater fire, shall not indictments lie against officials here who have shared in the fatal work of June 15? In this way only, it seems, may others be spared—for there are other pyres of floating tinder waiting for other victims, women and little children—from the fiery fate of those who in the General Slocum voyaged to their awful end.

“The Brooklyn Eagle says:

It is a dismal thought that with our expensive and highly organized boards and bureaus of inspection a dis­aster like this should be possible. Evidently the boat was no more than a fire trap. Here was a vessel without ef­fective fire protection, or effective fire drill of the crew, with a deck that broke like an egg-shell, and seemingly without boats or crews adequate to man them. Every­thing that courage and energy could do was done for res­cue, but that was little. Our theater fires had the effect of making playhouses more safe, for several years. This tragedy must at least result in substituting competent for political inspection, and in rousing ship-owners and cap­tains to a sense of long-neglected duty.

The New York Tribune gives the comforting assur­ance that “travel on excursion steamers will during the remainder of the season be safer than it was before”:

If no new precautions are adopted, at least a greater vigilance will be exercised. Again, the majority of the patrons of these boats also have something to learn about the safeguards provided for them by law. One person in ten, perhaps, can swim, but it is doubtful if one in a hun­dred can put on a life-preserver. To make use of the lat­ter in a crowd, and when a panic develops, may not be possible; but these hindrances do not always exist when the need arises. Many lives might have been saved last week, if, before going on board the General Slocum, all of her passengers had familiarized themselves with the ar­rangement of a life-preserver and the art of donning one in the right manner when the time of need came.

(Public Opinion. “The General Slocum Disaster,” Vol. XXXVI, N.25, 23 June 1904, 772-773.)

Smith, Dennis: “On the morning of June 15, 1904, she stood gleaming in the sun, waiting at a recreation pier to take on this day’s merrymakers—a Sunday school group from St. Mark’s German Lutheran Church. A German band played a sprightly polka as the gay crowds began boarding. It was a Wednesday, so the picnickers were mainly women and children—the 50 men on board were vastly outnumbered by the roughly 565 women and 745 children….

“…observers’ friendly smiles quickly changed to looks of horror. Puffs of smoke were coming out of the ship’s bow and no one on board seemed aware of it. Other boats frantically tooted their whistles, but the General Slocum sailed blithely on.

“Finally some little boys noticed the smoke coming out of a cabin on the main deck and raced aft to find a member of the crew to tell. The crewmember opened the door to the cabin—in which lamps, rope, and oil were stored—and the oxygen that raced in flashed the fire. Two crewmen now raced for fire hoses to train on the blaze But when they finally succeeded in getting water to run through the hose, its rotted fibers crumbled in their hands, and no water reached the flames.

“By this time people on shore had sent in the alarm. The nearest fire company came thundering out of their firehouse and galloped to the end of a close-by pier. The Zophar Mills, a powerful fireboat, came churning up the river in hot pursuit of the burning paddle wheeler. Other boats in the area also gave chase, to lend what assistance they could. Everyone expected Captain Van Schaick to steer his boat toward shore, where help could be given. Instead, they watched in disbelief as he continued on his midstream course upriver. The firefighters on the pier stared after the burning boat in total helplessness and frustration.

“On board the scene was even worse than the firefighters could imagine. As the boat continued plowing into the wind, the flames spread ever backward. People desperately crowded toward the stern, where many were forced overboard, frequently into the path of the churn­ing paddle wheels. Then the superstructure on which many of them were standing collapsed and sent them into the raging fire below.

“A few men on board who were keeping their heads went for the life preservers. Like the hoses, these were old and totally useless, and they crumbled to bits as the now panic-stricken passengers grabbed for them. Another man was tossing children to the waiting arms of the crew­men on boats that were trying to catch up with the blaz­ing paddle wheeler. Mothers were throwing their chil­dren overboard and jumping in after them.

“After what must have seemed an eternity, Captain Van Schaick beached the boat on North Brother Island, a medical station for patients with contagious diseases. Nurses and doctors waded or swam out to try to rescue victims. The firefighters who had been left back on the pier had sailed after the burning steamer in any boats they could commandeer. Now catching up with it, they also went to the rescue. So did the Zophar Mills.

“The rescuers dragged body after body up on shore— some living, many dead. Other bodies were still trapped in the burning hulk or in the paddle wheels and boxes. All of the crew but one escaped death. But a staggering num­ber of the passengers did not—more than one thousand of the nearly fourteen hundred who had so gaily set out that morning were or soon would be dead.

“The investigation that followed told a disgusting story of incompetence, misjudgment, and greed. The crew had been inexperienced and unprepared. Captain Van Schaick was later convicted for neglecting to train them in proper fire drill (though he was not convicted of two counts of manslaughter stemming from his failure to get his boat to shore sooner). The ship, supposedly inspected only a month before, was later found to have been “made entirely of wood, built in 1891 [without] fireproof hat­ches or bulkheads. All upper-works were of light wood, painted over many times and highly flammable. The hose was several years old and of the cheapest grade; the fire buckets on the main deck were not only out of reach, they had no water in them. The mate was not a licensed officer.” Obviously, other major villains in the tragedy were the inspectors who had somehow allowed the Gen­eral Slocum to pass fire inspection (whatever fines they had levied for violations of the steamer had been magically reduced from $1500 to $25). The guilty inspectors were dismissed, and future ship inspection was made more demanding, but once again an unbearable price had been paid to provide the fire protection the public so greatly needed.” (Smith. Dennis Smith’s History of Firefighting in America... 1978, p. 112-114.)

Smithsonian: “It was, by all accounts, a glorious Wednesday morning on June 15, 1904, and the men of Kleindeutschland — Little Germany, on Manhattan’s Lower East Side — were on their way to work. Just after 9 o’clock, a group from St. Mark’s Evangelical Lutheran Church on 6th Street, mostly women and children, boarded the General Slocum for their annual end-of-school outing. Bounding aboard what was billed as the “largest and most splendid excursion steamer in New York,” the children, dressed in their Sunday school outfits, shouted and waved flags as the adults followed, carrying picnic baskets for what was to be a long day away.

“A German band played on deck while the children romped and the adults sang along, waiting to depart. Just before 10 o’clock, the lines were cast off, a bell rang in the engine room, and a deck hand reported to Captain William Van Schaick that nearly a thousand tickets had been collected at the plank. That number didn’t include the 300 children under the age of 10, who didn’t require tickets. Including crew and catering staff, there were about 1,350 aboard the General Slocum as it steamed up the East River at 15 knots toward Long Island Sound, headed for Locust Grove, a picnic ground on Long Island’s North Shore, about two hours away.

“Built in 1891 and owned by the Knickerbocker Steamboat Company, the General Slocum was made of white oak, locust and yellow pine and licensed to carry 2,500 passengers. The ship carried that many life preservers, and just a month before a fire inspector had deemed its fire equipment to be in “fine working order.”

“As the ship reached 97th Street, some of the crew on the lower deck saw puffs of smoke rising through the wooden floorboards and ran below to the second cabin. But the men had never conducted any fire drills, and when they turned the ship’s fire hoses onto the flames, the rotten hoses burst. Rushing back above deck, they told Van Schaick that they had encountered a “blaze that could not be conquered.” It was “like trying to put out hell itself.’

“Onlookers in Manhattan, seeing the flames, shouted for the captain to dock immediately. Instead, Van Schaick, fearing the steering gear would break down in the strong currents and leave the Slocum helpless in mid-river, plowed full speed ahead. He aimed for a pier at 134th Street, but a tugboat captain warned him off, fearing the burning ship would ignite lumber stored there. Van Schaick made a run for North Brother Island, a mile away, hoping to beach the Slocum sideways so everyone would have a chance to get off. The ship’s speed, coupled with a fresh north wind, fanned the flames. Mothers began screaming for their children as passengers panicked on deck. As fire enveloped the Slocum, hundreds of passengers hurled themselves overboard, even though many could not swim.

“The crew distributed life jackets, but they too were rotten. Boats sped to the scene and pulled a few passengers to safety, but mostly they encountered children’s corpses bobbing in the currents along the tidal strait known as Hell Gate. One newspaper described it as “a spectacle of horror beyond words to express—a great vessel all in flames, sweeping forward in the sunlight, within sight of the crowded city, while her helpless, screaming hundreds were roasted alive or swallowed up in waves.”

“A witness reported seeing a large white yacht flying the insignia from the New York Yacht Club arrive on the scene just as the burning Slocum passed 139th Street. He said the captain positioned his yacht nearby and then stood on the bridge with his field glasses, “seeing women and children jump overboard in swarms and making no effort to go to their assistance…he did not even lower a boat.”

“Passengers trampled children in their rush to the Slocum‘s stern. One man, engulfed in flames, leaped over the port side and shrieked as the giant paddle wheel swallowed him. Others blindly followed him to a similar fate. A 12 year-old boy shimmied up the ship’s flagstaff at the bow and hung there until the heat became too great and he dropped into the flames. Hundreds massed together, only to bake to death. The middle deck soon gave way with a terrific crash, and passengers along the outside rails were jolted overboard. Women and children dropped into the choppy waters in clusters. In the mayhem, a woman gave birth—and when she hurled herself overboard, her newborn in her arms, they both perished.

“At Riverside Hospital on North Brother Island, where patients with typhoid and other contagious diseases had been quarantined, staff spotted the burning vessel approaching and quickly prepared the hospital’s engines and hoses to pump water, hoping to douse the flames. The island’s fire whistle blew and dozens of rescuers moved to the shore. Captain Van Schaick, his feet blistering from the heat below, managed to ground the Slocum sideways about 25 feet from shore. Rescuers swam to the ship and pulled survivors to safety. Nurses threw debris for passengers to cling to while others tossed ropes and life preservers. Some nurses dove into the water themselves and pulled badly burned passengers to safety. Still, the heat from the flames made it impossible to get close enough as the Slocum became engulfed from stem to stem.

“Firefighter Edward McCarroll dove into the water from his boat, the Wade, and pulled an 11 year-old girl to safety, passing her to a man with a boat hook. He went back for another when one woman grabbed him by the throat, pulling him under water momentarily, and shouted, “You must save my boy.” McCarroll dragged the child to the Wade, and they were both hoisted aboard. Crews from tugs following the Slocum were credited with pulling in the living and the dead “by the dozen.”

“Within an hour, 150 bodies were stretched out on blankets covering the lawn and sands of North Brother Island. Most of them were women. One was still clutching her lifeless baby, who was “tenderly taken out of her arms and laid on the grass beside her.” Rescued orphans of 3, 4 and 5 years old milled about the beach, dazed. Hours would pass before they could leave the island, many taken to Bellevue Hospital to treat wounds and await the arrival of grief-stricken relatives.

“Van Shaick was believed to be the last person off the Slocum when he jumped into the water and swam for shore, blinded and crippled. He would face criminal charges for his ship’s unpreparedness and be sentenced to 10 years in prison; he served four when he was pardoned by President William Howard Taft on Christmas Day, 1912.

“The death toll of 1,021, most of them women and children, made the burning of the Slocum New York City’s worst disaster until the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The fire was believed to have been touched off by a carelessly tossed match or cigarette that ignited a barrel of packing hay below deck. There were also remarkable tales of survival. A 10-month-old boy floated to shore, uninjured but orphaned, and lay unclaimed at a hospital until his grandmother identified him days later. Eleven-year-old Willie Keppler had joined the excursion without his parents’ permission but made it through the flailing of non-swimmers who dragged fellow passengers down with them; he was too scared of punishment to return home until he saw his name among the dead in the next day’s newspaper. “I thought I’d come home and git the licking instead of breaking me mudder’s heart,” Keppler was quoted as saying. “So I’m home, and me mudder only kissed me and me fadder gave me half a dollar for being a good swimmer.”

“The men of Little Germany were suddenly without families. Funerals were held for more than a week, and the desolate schoolyards of Kleindeutschland were painful reminders of their loss. Many widowers and broken families moved uptown to Yorkville to be closer to the scene of the disaster, establishing a new Germantown on Manhattan’s Upper East Side. Some returned to Germany. Before long, Kleindeutschland disappeared under New York’s next wave of Polish and Russian immigrants.”[4]

Comment on the article by Jessica Sterns, 2-25-2012: “Safety is an attitude. Too many lives are lost with great expense because those in charge will not prepare for the time when a disaster happens, lives are lost, and the ensuing litigation mostly enriches the lawyers. In the modern airlines only a few of the passengers listen to the required safety briefing. The airline companies sell seats in the emergency exit row for a higher fare rather than configuring the row so that a crew member is seated there. It seems that in every industry profits come ahead of safety considerations. If safety was proactive rather than reactive, I believe that many lives would be lost [saved] and in the long term the cost would be a fraction of what it is today. Everyone must make safety a part of their living life.” (Smithsonian. “A Spectacle of Horror: The Burning of the General Slocum.” 2-21-2012.)

U.S. Commission to Investigate Slocum Disaster (President Roosevelt Letter, 10-12-1904):

“My Dear Sir [to Secretary of Commerce and Labor]: I have received the report of the “Commission of the United States on the Investigation of the General Slocum Disaster,” and the report of the Department of Justice of October 12th, recapitulating what has been done by the Department of Justice in connection with the criminal proceedings taken against various individuals because of their connection with the disaster. I send you herewith both reports. Punitive action by the Government can of course only take two forms: One, that of legal proceedings against those either within or without the Service, and two, removal from office of those within the Service. It appears that the Department of Justice has already secured indictments against the master and captain of the Slocum and against the managing directors of the Knickerbocker Steamboat Company, to which company the Slocum belonged, for misconduct, negligence, and inattention to duty by the captain, and for aiding and abetting therein by the managing directors. Furthermore the Department of Justice has secured indictments against Henry Lundberg and John W. Fleming, the assistant inspectors of the Steamboat-Inspection Service who actually inspected the Slocum, for fraud, misconduct, and inattention to duty. Lundberg had been appointed merely on probation in the Service, and has been dropped. There can, of course, be no further action taken about Fleming until his trial has been finished; although it does not follow that an acquittal would prevent the Department from discharging him from the Serv-ice. In addition, the Department of Justice has secured the indictment of the manager and three employees of the Nonpareil Cork Works, of Camden, N. J., for putting upon the market compressed cork blocks for use in making life-preservers, each of which blocks contained in its center a piece of bar-iron weighing several ounces. This last offense was of so heinous a character that it is difficult to comment upon it with proper self-restraint. It appears that the national legislature has never enacted a law providing in set terms for the punishment of this particular species of infamy, doubtless because it never entered the head of any man that so gross an infamy could be perpetrated. I suggest that you report this whole matter to Congress, transmitting these two reports, and at that time calling special attention to the need of imposing an adequate penalty for the making or selling of defective life-saving appliances.

“So much for what the Department of Justice has done in reference to the disaster. But in addition to the men put on trial by the Department of Justice, action should be taken against those employees whose responsibility for the state of things producing the accident has been brought out in the report of the Commission. According to this report it appears that in addition to the two assistant inspectors who are now on trial, the Supervising Inspector of the Second District, Mr. Rodie, and the two Local Inspectors of the Port of New York, Messrs. Dumont and Barrett, should all three be removed for laxity and neglect in performing their duties. As regards the conduct of Mr. Rodie, Mr. Uhler dissents from the conclusions of the four other commissioners. I agree with the conclusions of the other four. Laxity and neglect, where the consequences maybe so terrible as they have proved to be in this case, cannot be passed over even where there has been good conduct in other respects on the part of the man implicated. Accordingly the three officials named will be removed from the Service. Moreover, you will please direct their successors in office at once to conduct a thorough examination of the entire inspection force of the Port of New York, with the object of weeding out all the men whom such examination shall show to be unfitted to perform the very arduous and responsible duties of their positions. The Supervising Inspector-General has at present no headquarters force of special agents, so that it is undoubtedly very difficult for him to exercise any adequate and direct supervision over the various local divisions of the inspection service. In each division he must rely chiefly on the fidelity and energy of the local heads; and if these fail to perform their duty they must be held accountable. He must, however, exercise as thorough a supervision as the means at his disposal allow. In order that I may be informed as to the exact condition of the Service in all its parts, I direct you to order a searching investigation, in

continuance of the investigation of the Commission, into the conduct of the central office and of every outside subdivision of the Service save that in New York.

“You will also make such changes in the regulations as are recommended by the Commission, and you will therefore call a special meeting of the Board of Supervising Inspectors for this purpose. You will also lay before the Congress a request that the law be changed in the various particulars recommended by the Commission. I wish particular emphasis laid upon the proposal of the Commission that there be created bylaw a special body thoroughly to investigate the laws which are supposed to provide for the safety of passengers on steamboats, especially on excursion boats, where the prime causes of danger are the overcrowding and the flimsy and highly inflammable character of the superstructures.”

Very truly yours,

Theodore Roosevelt.

Hon. V. H. Metcalf, Secretary of Commerce and Labor.” [pp. ii-iii.]

(United States Commission of Investigation Upon the Disaster to the Steamer “General Slocum.” Report of the United States Commission of Investigation Upon the Disaster to the Steamer “General Slocum.” Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904.)

U.S. House of Representatives: “Mr. Joyce: …in regard to the Slocum, there was an absolute panic. There was a boat that caught fire 150 yards from shore, where the captain could have gotten her to the dock in 3 minutes and had half a dozen fire engines pouring a stream on her, and here were 600 people taken from the water, women and children, without one having a burn the size of a match head. It was a panic, but still it was a lamentable disaster. Everybody became panic stricken on that occasion.

“Mr. Manahan: And the crew was not a good crew?

“Mr. Joyce. No; it was not in the case with the Slocum; but since that disaster there is not a steamboat in New York that is not subject to the fire drill regulations, and we do not know when the steamboat inspectors may come aboard the boat and order a fire drill….

“Mr. Greene. It this law [provisions of Seaman’s Law, under consideration, requiring lifeboats for all passengers, and “able bodied seamen” as crew] had been in effect at the time of the General Slocum disaster—

“Mr. Joyce. I think we would have had a different story to tell….

“Mr. Greene. In what respect:

“Mr. Joyce. I think we would have had a more efficient crew. But in the case of the General Slocum it was not a case of the lifeboats at all. Everybody rushed to the rail and jumped overboard and the crush carried away the side rail….”

(Joyce. Testimony: US Cong., House. The Seamen’s Bill (Hearings on S. 136) Pt. 1, 1914, 90-91)

….

Later, same hearings; Capt. Atwood[5] and Representative Henry Bruckner dialogue on Slocum:

“Mr. Bruckner. Do you remember the Slocum disaster?

“Mr. Atwood. That was a terrible thing. That was in the river.

“Mr. Bruckner. Why were there not more lives saved?

“Mr. Atwood. They were thrown away.

“Mr. Bruckner. Don’t you think if the captain of that boat had looked to the safety of the lives instead of the safety of the vessel that more people would have been saved?

“Mr. Atwood. Yes, sir. It is outrageous to think of it. There was no business to have lost those lives.

“Mr. Buckner. Absolutely no reason?

“Mr. Atwood. No, sir.

“Mr. Bruckner. Do you think the captain thought of the safety of the boat more than the safety of the passengers?

“Mr. Atwood. I do not know what that captain was thinking about. I can not imagine any man but a crazy man doing what he did.

“Mr. Buckner. Do yon know he came within 20 feet of shore and then turned the boat offshore?

“Mr. Atwood. Yes; I know he did.

“Mr. Bruckner. So do I; it is in my district.

“Mr. Atwood. Yes; you and I agree on that.

“Mr. Bruckner. I was an official of the city at that time—the commissioner of public works—and there were 30 street highway men working there, and each one of them told me the same story.

“Mr. Atwood. There were freighters there right alongside of the dock.

“Mr. Bruckner. There was a large factory there employing about 800 men?

“Mr. Atwood. The Delaware Machinery Co.—that would have come to the rescue; yes.

(U. S. Congress, House. The Seamen’s Bill (Hearings, on S. 136) Pt. 1, 1914, p. 413.)

U.S. SIS: “June 15. – At 9:33 a.m. the excursion steamer General Slocum left the foot of East Third street, New York, with an excursion party from St. Mark’s German Lutheran Church Society on board, bound for Locust Grove, Long Island, N.Y. There were 1,500 people in the party. When the steamer was in the neighborhood of Sunken Meadows, East River, the steamer was discovered to be on fire, and the captain ran the steamer for land, beaching her on North Brother Island, East River. List of identified dead, 897; unidentified dead, 61; total, 958. (From report of police department, August 2, 1904.) Injured, 180. Investigated July 6, 7, 11, 12, 18, and 25 and August 8, 1904. Decision August 22, revoking the licenses of William H. Van Schaick, master and pilot, Edward Van Wart, pilot, and Benjamin F. Conklin, chief engineer. Pilot Edward Van Wart appealed to the supervising inspector, second district, who rendered decision October 8, 1904, revoking the decision of the local inspectors and directing that his license be returned to him. Also, Chief Engineer Benjamin F. Conklin appealed to the supervising inspector, second district, and as the result of a hearing authorized by the honorable Secretary of Commerce and Labor, the decision of the local inspectors was revoked, and his license was restored to him by the supervising inspector’s decision of December 17.” (US Steamboat-Inspection Service. Annual Report 1905, p. 43.).

U.S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor: “Washington, Oct. 16. – The National commission appointed by ex-Secretary Cortelyou of the Department of Commerce and Labor to investigate the Slocum disaster has rendered its report, and upon the findings and recommendations in it President Roosevelt has ordered the removal from the service of the Government of Robert S. Rodie, Supervising Inspector of the Steamboat Inspection Service of the Second District, in which New York is, and James A. Dumont and Thomas A. Barrett, local Inspectors in charge of the Port of New York. The commission, with the exception of Gen. Uhler, holds them directly responsible for the laxity of the steamboat inspection to which the Slocum disaster is directly attributable. Gen. Uhler, who is Supervising Inspector General of the Steamboat Inspection Service, concurs in all of the findings except that part of the report that places the responsibility on the Supervising Inspector.

“The President’s letter on the subject goes also into the matter of the Nonpareil Cork Works of Camden, N.J., which put iron bars into life-preserver blocks, and contains a strong recommendation to Secretary Metcalf of the Department of Commerce and Labor, to whom it is addressed, as to the future conduct of the Steamboat Inspection Service….The letter is as follows:

White House, Washington, Oct. 12, 1904.

My Dear Sir:

I have received the report of the “Commission of the United States on the Investigation of the General Slocum Disaster,” and the report of the Department of Justice of Oct. 12 recapitulating what has been done by the Department of Justice in connection with the criminal proceedings taken against various individuals because of their connection with the disaster. I send you herewith both reports.

Punitive action by the Government can of course only take two forms: (1) That of legal proceedings against those either within or without the service, and (2) removal from office of those within the service. It appears that the Department of Justice has already secured indictments against the master and Captain of the Slocum and against the managing Directors of the Knickerbocker Steamboat Company, to which company the Slocum belonged, for misconduct, negligence, and inattention to duty by the Captain, and for aiding and abetting therein by the managing Directors.

Furthermore the Department of Justice has secured indictments against Henry Lundberg and John W. Fleming, the Assistant Inspectors of the Steamboat Inspection Service, who actually inspected the Slocum, for fraud, misconduct, and inattention to duty. Lundberg had been appointed merely on probation in the service, and has been dropped. There can, of course, be no further action taken about Fleming until his trial has been finished, although it does not follow that an acquittal would prevent the department from discharging him from the service.

In addition, the Department of Justice has secured the indictment of the manager and three employees of the Nonpareil Cork Works of Camden, N.J., for putting upon the market compressed cork blocks for use in making life-preservers, each of which blocks contained in its centre a piece of bar-iron weighing several ounces.

This last offense was of so heinous a character that it is difficult to comment upon it with proper restraint. It appears that the National Legislature has never enacted a law providing in set terms for the punishment of this particular species of infamy, doubtless because it never entered the head of any man that so gross an infamy could be perpetrated. I suggest that you report this whole matter to Congress, transmitting these two reports, and at that time calling special attention to the need of imposing an adequate penalty for the making or selling of defective life saving appliances.

So much for what the Department of Justice has done in reference to the disaster. But in addition to the men put on trial by the Department of Justice, action should be taken against those employees whose responsibility for the state of things producing the accident has been brought out in the report of the commission. According to this report, it appears that in addition to the two Assistant Inspectors who are now on trial, the Supervising Inspector of the Second District, Mr. Rodie, and the two local Inspectors of the Port of New York, Messrs. Dumont and Barrett, should all three be removed for laxity and neglect in performing their duties. As regards the conduct of Mr. Rodie, Mr. Uhler dissents from the conclusions of the four other Commissioners.

I agree with the conclusions of the other four. Laxity and neglect, where the consequences may be so terrible as they have proved to be in this case, can not be passed over even where there has been good conduct in other respects on the part of the man implicated. Accordingly the three officials named will be removed from the service.

Moreover, you will please direct their successors in office at once to conduct a thorough examination of the entire inspection force of the Port of New York, with the object of weeding out all the men whom such examination shall show to be unfitted to perform the very arduous and responsible duties of their positions. The Supervising Inspector General has at present no headquarters force of special agents, so that it is undoubtedly very difficult for him to exercise any adequate and direct supervision over the various local divisions of the inspection service. In each division he must rely chiefly on the fidelity and energy of the local heads; and if these fail to perform their duty they must be held accountable. He must however, exercise as thorough a supervision as the means at his disposal allow.

In order that I may be informed as to the exact condition of the Service in all its parts, I direct you to order a searching investigation, in continuance of the investigation of the Commission, into the conduct of the central office and of every outside subdivision of the service save that in New York.

You will also make such changes in the regulations as are recommended by the Commission, and you will therefore call a special meeting of the Board of Supervising Inspectors for this purpose. You will also lay before the Congress a request that the law be changed in the various particulars recommended by the Commission. I wish particular emphasis laid upon the proposal of the Commission that there be created by law a special body thoroughly to investigate the laws which are supposed to provide for the safety of passengers on steamboats, especially on excursion boats, where the prime causes of danger are the overcrowding and the flimsy and highly inflammable character of the superstructures.

Very truly yours.

Theodore Roosevelt.

From Annual Report 1904, Supervising Inspector General, Steamboat Inspection Service (p. 6):

I desire…to call you attention to the construction of the steamer, which is typical of the excursion steamers of the country generally, and of New York in particular; highly inflammable, of large capacity, and carrying at times the full allowance of passengers; often, as in the case of the Slocum, a very large proportion of whom are women and children, and in many instances more children than adults. Of the 1,358 passengers on the Slocum, 745 were children, but it is clearly manifest that, notwithstanding this peculiar condition, no extra precautions were taken to promote the safety of this large complement of women and children, or to provide them with substantial care.

The emergency that preceded the disaster that compassed the death of so many of the passengers should have been met promptly and the disaster averted by a crew drilled to meet just such contingencies; but total lack of discipline, and absence of prompt action under efficient direction, turned what should have been successful effort into disastrous confusion and failure. I would suggest, therefore, that the matter of crew efficiency be made the subject of legislation, with a view to providing authority for local inspectors of steamboats to designate the number and character of a vessel’s crew, in order to guard against the employment of undisciplined and inefficient crews, as well as against unlicensed or incompetent officers. I would also suggest that legislation governing construction of passenger steamers be made a special subject for the consideration of Congress, with a view to making such construction as near fireproof and as near unsinkable as utility will permit.”

“On June 15, 1904, the passenger excursion steamer General Slocum was burned in the harbor of New York, with a loss of 957 lives. The appalling nature of this disaster, together with certain features attend­ant thereon, called for immediate and special action by the Depart­ment, and on June 23, 1904, there was appointed the United States Commission of Investigation upon the Disaster to the General Slocum. This Commission was made up as follows: Lawrence 0. Murray, Assistant Secretary of Commerce and Labor, chairman; John M. Wil­son, brigadier-general, U. S. Army, retired; Cameron McR. Winslow, commander, U. S. Navy; Herbert Knox Smith, Deputy Commissioner of Corporations, Department of Commerce and Labor, secretary; and George Uhler, Supervising Inspector-General, Steamboat-Inspection Service, Department of Commerce and Labor.

“The Commission was instructed to make a thorough investigation into the disaster, to consider such other matters bearing upon the safety of passenger traffic upon the navigable waters of the United States as might be brought to its attention by such investigation, and to make a report thereon, accompanied by recommendations for such departmental or legislative action as it might deem necessary. On July 19, 1904, the Commission began its formal hearings in New York City. Twenty-three days were devoted to the taking of testimony in that city, and forty-two days to the preparation and digesting of the same and the completion of the report. On October 11 the report was submitted to the President, and was published on October 17, together with a letter of the President thereon and the report of the Department of Justice showing the status of the criminal proceedings taken in connection with the disaster.

“This investigation by the Commission revealed a very unsatisfactory condition of the Steamboat-Inspection Service in the port of New York and resulted in the removal of the supervising inspector for the second district and the local board of inspectors for the port of New York. The report of the Commission found that the methods of inspection in the port of New York and of the officials since removed were largely responsible for the disaster. The report also called atten­tion to a number of defects and recommends changes in existing statutes and regulations relating to the Service. There is urgent need that the laws relating to the Service be strengthened and improved in accordance with the recommendations. In view of this fact attention is respectfully directed to the report and recommendations of the Commission and the accompanying letter of the President.

“By order of the Secretary, there was also carried on during the months of July, August, September, and October, 1904, a reinspection of the passenger steamers in the port of New York by inspectors from other ports detailed for that purpose. This reinspection was had both for the immediate object of securing proper conditions in that port and also as a part of the work of the Commission in ascertaining the conditions existing there at the time of the disaster. The results of the reinspection were incorporated in the report of the Commission.

“In pursuance of the letter of the President, the Board of Supervising Inspectors of the. Steamboat-Inspection Service was convened in Wash­ington on October 25, 1904, in special session, for the purpose of revising the rules and regulations of that Service. This work is not yet completed. Also, in pursuance of that part of the letter of the President which directs a further investigation of the Service in continuation of the investigation by the Commission, officers of the Navy have been detailed to make investigation in respective districts….

“These officers are now engaged upon the work assigned to them and upon completion of their work, a report will be made summarizing the conditions as found in the entire Steamboat-Inspection Service….” (U.S. Dept. of Commerce and Labor. Annual Report 1904, p. 31.)

Wingfield: “….For days afterward, bodies would wash ashore. Only 321 passengers survived from a total of 1,358 passengers. The final death count totaled 1,021. The next largest death toll in the United States would come decades later with 2,974 dead from 9/11….” (Wingfield, Valerie (Archives Unit, NY Public Library). “The General Slocum Disaster of June 15, 1904.” 6-13-2011.)

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[1] Writes: “As high as 1200 hundred were reported dead, mostly women and children.” [Not using in tally in that within the narrative it is noted that “Contemporary accounts hawked the death toll at anywhere between 833 and 1,200…” In that the 1,200 number appears to be linked to newspaper accounts of the time, we choose to rely other sources noted herein.

[2] Reference is to the steamer Glen Island which caught fire in Long Island Sound, Dec 17, 1904, with the loss of nine lives. (Boston Sunday Globe. “Nine Perish on Burning Vessel,” Dec 18, 1904.)

[3] Meaning, in today’s usage, flammable.

[4] Cites as sources: “One Man Without a Heart,” Chicago Daily Tribune, June 16, 1904. “Recover 493 Dead,” Boston Globe, June 16, 1904. “Captain of Boat Tells His Story,” Chicago Tribune, June 16, 1904. “East Side’s Heart Torn By the Horror,” New York Times, June 16, 1904. “General Slocum Disaster,” http://www.maggieblanck.com/Goehle/GeneralSlocum.html. “A Brief Account of the General Slocum Disaster,” Edward T. O’Donnell, http://www.edwardtodonnell.com/ also, http://www.politicsforum.org/forum/viewtopic.php?f=69&t=59062. Edward T. O’Donnell, Ship Ablaze: The Tragedy of the Steamboat General Slocum, Broadway, 2003.

[5] Capt. Edward B. Atwood, President, Cape Cod Steamship Co., Plymouth, Mass.